Strategic regulation of a multi-national banking industry by Dalen, Dag Morten & Olsen, Trond E.
Strategic regulation of a multi-national banking
industry
Dag Morten Dalen
Norwegian School of Management
E.mail: dag.m.dalen@bi.no
Trond E. Olsen
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
E.mail: trond.olsen@nhh.no
December 13, 2002
Abstract
This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry
of multi-national bank (MNB) subsidiaries for banking supervision and reg-
ulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB
operates under the legislation of several countries - both the home country
and the host countries. Although these countries have agreed upon mini-
mum standards and supervisory principles, such as in the EU directives or
the Basle Accords, substantial degrees of freedom are still left to the national
regulators. An interesting and important issue is whether the decentralized
approach to regulation of MNBs creates ineﬃciencies and finanacial insta-
bility. Host country regulation of MNB subsidiaries creates cross-border
externalities, where the supervisors and regulators in one country will be
concerened with the standards in the home country and in other host coun-
tries. Our main result is that lack of international coordination of banking
regulation works to lower capital adequacy requirements. In equilibrium,
however, regulators respond by increasing the incentives to improve asset
quality, making the probability of banking failure insensitive to the decen-
tralized nature of banking regulation. Ownership of the MNB is shown to
be of importance for the outcome of strategic banking regulation.
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1 Introduction
The banking industry is becoming more international. Technological changes
allow financial markets to integrate and regulatory changes have lowered bar-
riers for cross-border banking. By 1996, total assets of overseas branches
and subsidiaries of US banks exceeded $1.1 trillion. In the same year, 58 per
cent of UK loans were made by branches and subsidiaries of non-UK banks.
In Germany, 17 per cent of private commercial bank loans were made by non-
German banks.1 In spite of globalization, the banking industry is still one of
the most regulated industries in the world (Santos (2000)). Banks in most
countries have to meet solvency standards and reserve requirements, pay de-
posit insurance premiums, and accept various forms of monitoring of their
risk management systems and of their individual transactions (ensuring, for
instance, that adequate collateral was put up), etc.. The combination of ex-
tensive regulation and a trend towards integration of financial markets raises
new issues with respect to international harmonization of bank regulation.
Cross-border banking may take several forms. A bank holding com-
pany may expand business internationally by lending directly to customers
abroad from its domestic oﬃces. Other possibilities is to set up branches
or subsidiaries abroad which may raise deposits and grant loans. With re-
spect to regulation there is an important distinction between branches and
subsidiaries.
Branches established abroad are legally an integrated part of the par-
ent bank, and, therefore is under the regulation of the home country. The
European Union’s (EU’s) single market and principle of ”one single licence”
allow parents banks with a licence from an EU-country to set up branches
anywhere within EU. The parent bank needs to respect the regulatory frame-
work of the home country. Subsidiaries are separated as legal entities from
the parent bank. These entities are separately capitalized, and may there-
fore fail independently. Consequently, the subsidiary needs its own banking
licence, and must respect the regulatory framework of the host country.
Although subsidiaries are treated as a seperate bank by the host country,
all subsidiaries are owned (at least with majority) by the parent bank. As
the owner, the bank holding company is able to control important decisions
with respect to business strategy. Resources and skills within the holding
company may thus be transferred to its subsidiaries.
EU figures show that subsidiaries are important part in the ongoing
integration (ECB,1999). In Ireland, the market share of foreign subsidiaries
was 35 per cent in 1997. In the UK, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands the
market share of foreign subsidiaries inn 1997 was in the range of 8 to 5 per
cent. Other markets such as Italy, Greece and Denmark have experience less
entry from foreign subsidiaries. In the Nordic countries, the largest bank
1Figures provided by Calzolari and Loranth (2001).
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Nordea has chosen to compete in the Nordic market with subsidiaries in
each of the countries Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
This paper focuses on the consequences of multi-national bank (MNB)
subsidiaries for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands
internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB will operate under the legisla-
tion of several countries - both the home country and the host countries.
Although these countries have agreed upon minimum standards and super-
visory principles, such as in the EU directives or the Basle Accords, substan-
tial degrees of freedom are still left to the national regulators. An interesting
and important issue is whether the decentralized approach to regulation of
MNBs creates ineﬃciencies and financial instability. Host country regulation
of MNB subsidiaries creates cross-border externalities, where the supervi-
sors and regulators in one country will be concerned with the standards in
the home country and in other host countries.
As noted by Rochet (1999), there is a trend towards more flexible ap-
proaches for regulating banks that take into account the decentralized in-
formation of individual banks. He states that ”this means that the adverse
selection paradigm of contract theory is relevant for studying banking reg-
ulation”. Giammarino et al. (1993) is an early example of using a contract
theory approach to the study of optimal banking regulation. We adopt their
framework to study strategic (non-cooperative) regulation of MNBs.
Strategic regulation is modelled as multi-principal regulation of a MNB
that allocates resources towards activities that increase asset quality. Our
main result is that lack of international coordination of banking regulation
works to lower capital adequacy requirements. In equilibrium, however, reg-
ulators respond by increasing the MNB’s incentives to improve asset quality,
making the probability of banking failure insensitive to the decentralized na-
ture of banking regulation. Ownership of the MNB is shown to be of impor-
tance for the outcome of strategic banking regulation. If the MNB is owned
by shareholders from outside the market operated by the bank (”third-
country sharholders”), the regulatory regime becomes more distortive since
the regulators then become more eager to extract banking profit. With
more ”inside-shareholders”, the regulatory policy becomes more pro-bank
industry oriented. Therefore, with a trend towards more flexible approaches
to banking regulation, we would expect ”third-country”-owned MNBs to be
handicapped in the market.
Although international coordination of regulation and supervision, and
the issue of ”level playing fields” in financial markets have been high on the
political agenda, theoretical studies have until recently been rare. Calzolari
and Loranth (2001) survey specific regulatory issues brought about by MNBs
with particulat attention to solvency and prudential regulation. Calzolari
and Loranth (2002) develops a model to analyze the incentives of home
and host counry regulators to intervene with prudential actions in MNBs.
Both branch- and subsidiary-organized MNBs are considered. The policy
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decision of the regulators is whether or not to close the bank, based on
the received information about the quality of the bank. When there is
complete information exchange between the regulators, they show that the
host country regulator of a subsidiary-organized MNB has less incentive to
intervene than the home country regulator of a branch-organized MNB.
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2001) analyze the incentives for independent
domestic bank regulators to coordinate regulatory policy. Their model is
consistent with branch-organized MNBs that makes banks working under
diﬀerent regulatory regimes meet in the same market. After identifying a
so-called ”race to the bottom” without coordination, they investigate the
condititions under which regulators would benefit from coordination and,
hence, giving up independence. Somewhat relatedly, Sinn (2001) shows that
there will be undersupply of regulation due to what he calls systems com-
petition. A positive externality of the national solvency regulation explains
the undersupply of such regulation. Boot, Dezelan and Milbourn (2000),
investigate the importance of a level playing field in a simple industrial or-
ganization model of banking competition. The cost of regulation, in terms
of lost profit, is larger when the regulated banks compete in a market with
other non-regulated banks. A recent paper by Stolz (2002) introduces in-
terbank market in a model similar to Giammarino et al. (1993). Assuming
a subsidiary-organized MNB, as in the present paper, she shows that a na-
tional supervisor/regulator will not adequately internalise costs imposed on
other economies by hazardous banking behaviour in her jurisdiction. The
cross-country contagion eﬀect caused by interbank lending will not be inter-
nalized by supervisors with a national mandate only.
The present paper diﬀers from the above in several aspects. We formu-
late the regulatory game under decentralization as a common-agency. This
allows us to derive the national regulator’s optimal response to MNBs, and,
further, to identify the sources of regulatory ineﬃciency. As pointed out
above, our analysis provides insights into the importance of bank ownership
under decentralized regulation.
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives the optimal regulatory policy under international coordi-
nation. Section 4 derives the regulatory equilibrium without coordination.
In section 5 the importance of ownership is discussed. Section 6 derives ex-
plicit solutions for regulatory policies by assuming specific functional forms.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a multinational bank (MNB) with subsidiaries in two diﬀerent
countries, i = 1, 2. Each subsidiary is operating under the legislation of
the host country. In each of the two countries there are a number of firms
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having access to risky investment projects that need external funding, and
bank loans are assumed to be their only source of funding. The average
return of the investment projects in each country is treated as a random
variable with a distribution G(r\q) defined over [r, r]. Here q is the quality
of the loan portfolio acquired by the bank. An increase in quality shifts the
distribution of return in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, i.e.
Gq(r\q) ≤ 0 ∀ r ∈ [r, r]. The two countries are assumed to be identical as
far as business environments are concerned. Given the quality of the loan
portfolio, therefore, the distribution of average return is the same in both
countries. In both countries there is also a risk-free asset with a rate of
return equal to 1.
Loan quality. The quality of the loan portfolio in the two subsidiaries
is assumed to be a function of the innate quality of the investment projects,
the amount of resources devoted to auditing and screening of the invest-
ment projects, and country-specific macroeconomic conditions. Following
our assumption of identical business environments, the innate quality of the
projects is assumed to be identical, and denoted by θ. The amount of re-
sources devoted to auditing in a subsidiary is given by ei. Adding local
macroeconomic conditions βi, the quality of the loan portfolio in country i
is assumed to be given by
qi = βiθ + ei. (1)
The regulator is able to observe the realized quality of the loan portfolio in
its jurisdiction. This assumption is consistent with the periodic inspections
of bank assets that regulators undertake in practice. Admittedly, inspections
and supervisions provide only imperfect measures of asset quality, but as a
simplifying assumption this is justified by the fact that these (imperfect)
measures are valuable and considered to be important by the regulator.
Although the final asset quality is observed by the regulator, the MNB
has private information about the innate quality of the investment projects
θ. Having observed a given asset quality, the regulator does not know the
amount of resources the bank needed to spend on auditing in order to achieve
this level.
It is common knowledge that innate quality is distributed according to
a cumulative distribution function F (θ), with density f(θ) over an interval£
θ, θ
¤
. The bank and the regulator are assumed to know the macroeconomic
situation. If there is a recession βi = β. Else βi = β, where β > β. Later,
β will denote β1 + β2.
Funding. At the outset, the MNB’s only asset is that it has access to
the market of risky investment projects in the two countries. Provided that
the MNB complies with rules set up by the regulator, the bank can issue
deposits and grant loans to firms with investment projects. There are two
funding sources available for the bank - outside equity and deposits. The
MNB must promise the new shareholders an expected return equal to reEi
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in order to attract outside equity of size Ei to the subsidiary in country
i. re (> 1) is an exogenous expected rate of return that makes investors
willing to provide equity. The other source of funding is insured deposits
Di. To simply exposition, the bank is assumed to attract deposits of fixed
size in both countries. The amount of deposits are normalized to 1, i.e.
D1 = D2 = 1. Deposits are paid an interest rate equal to 1.
The MNB’s costs of improving asset quality beyond the base levels (β1θ)
and (β2θ) are given by ψ(e1 + e2). These costs reduce the MNB’s initial
wealth. ψ(.) is an increasing and strictly convex function, which implies
that the MNB’s eﬀort in the two jurisdictions are substitutes, i.e. ∂
2ψ
∂e1∂e2 =
ψ00 > 0. Finally, each subsidiary must satisfy the cash flow constraint
Li +Ri + Pi = Di +Ei, (2)
where Li is the amount of risky loans granted by the bank in country i,
Ri is the amount of risk-free assets kept by the bank, and Pi is the deposit
insurance premium paid in order to be allowed to run the bank in jurisdiction
i. Following Giammarino et al. (1993), we assume that Di = Li. Hence,
the size of the bank’s activity in the two countries, in terms of risky loans,
is exogenous. This assumption highlights the important role of equity as a
means for adjusting the probability of bank default. Our focus is on the role
of regulation and supervision in aﬀecting loan quality and the probability of
banking failure.
Expected profit. The expected global profit of the MNB may now be
written:
π =
2X
i=1
Z r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dG(ri\qi)− re
2X
i=1
(Ri + Pi)− ψ(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ) (3)
The first term is the expected value of the cash flow earned in the two
jurisdictions. rbi is the break-even return level. If the average return of a
subsidiary drops below this level, the subsidiary fails, and the governmental
deposit insurance fund pays the depositors. Note that the break-even level
of return depends on the amount of reserves kept by the bank; it is given by
rbi = 1−Ri. Since equity is used to keep reserves (and to pay the insurance
premium), the role of equity is to adjust the probability of default.
Subtracting the second term in (3), which is the cost of funding risk
free assets and the insurance premium with outside equity, we get the
insider’s share of the cash flow. Note that the outside shareholders are
not guaranteed a return equal to re. Instead, in order to provide capi-
tal equal to Ei, they must be given an equity ratio zi, such that reEi =
zi
R r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dG(ri\qi). Outside equity is costly for the insider because
its share of the cash-flow (1− zi) is reduced. The last term in (3) is the cost
of improving loan quality.
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Regulator’s objective. The objective of the regulator in each juris-
diction is to provide deposit insurance at lowest costs for the society. The
net payoﬀ to the government from providing deposit insurance is given by
(note that the second term is negative due to the definition of rbi )
Wi = r
ePi + (1 + b)
Z rbi
0
[ri +Ri − 1] dG(ri\qi) (4)
The first term in the bracket is the value of the insurance premium collected
by the regulator, and the last term is the expected loss from a banking fail-
ure. b captures the additional bankruptcy cost due to negative externalities.
Using (3) to substitute for rePi in (4), we get
Wi =



P2
i=1{
R r
rbi
[r +Ri − 1] dG(r\qi)}+ (1 + b)
R rbi
0 [r +Ri − 1] dG(r\qi)
−re
hP2
i=1Ri + Pj
i
− ψ(
P2
i=1 qi − βθ)− π



(5)
The reason why increased bank profit is costly for the regulator, is that the
insurance premium collected by the regulator has to be lowered. Noting
that global surplus for the regulators W is given by W1 +W2, W may be
written
W =
( P2
i=1{
R r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dG(ri\qi) + (1 + b)
R rbi
0 [ri +Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi)}
−re
P2
i=1Ri − ψ(
P2
i=1 qi − βθ)− π
)
(6)
If the regulator’s objective function includes domestic bank profit, we
will have Wi = (1 + λ)Si + δiπ, where Si is now the expected payoﬀ to the
goverment from the deposit insurance. Here λ is the general equilibrium
shadow costs of public funds (assumed equal in the two countries), and δi
is the ownership share of country i. In this case a regulatory scheme that
generates bank profit is less costly for the regulator. The importance of
bank ownership is treated in section 5.
3 Cooperative regulation of the MNB
In this section a single regulator maximizes the global surplus of the deposit
insurance scheme. The policy instruments available to the regulator are the
required amount of risk free asset to be held by the bankRi and the insurance
premium Pi. In eﬀect, this also determines the level of outside equity Ei.
In addition, the regulator specifies the level of asset quality the bank should
achieve qi. However, when choosing a regulatory policy, the regulator suﬀers
from asymmetry of information. The regulator does not know the quality of
the business environment, which is crucial for the bank’s cost of acquiring
a certain quality level of the loan portfolio.
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Following standard procedures, the regulatory policy can be analyzed in
terms of a direct revelation mechanism. In our case, this means that the bank
makes a report on the intrinsic quality of the business environment θˆ, and the
regulator responds by oﬀering a regulatory package
n
Pi(θˆ), Ri(θˆ), qi(θˆ)
o
, i =
1, 2, from a pre-announced menu. According to the Revelation Principle, any
indirect mechanism that links the reserve requirements and the insurance
premium to the asset quality qi, has its equivalence in a direct mechanism
which makes the MNB report its true type θ.
The MNB’s profit as a function of reported type θˆ and the true type θ
is given by
π(θˆ\θ) =
2X
i=1
{
Z r
rbi
h
r + Rˆi − 1
i
dG(ri\qˆi)−re(Rˆi+ Pˆi)}−ψ(
2X
i=1
qˆi−βθ) (7)
The incentive compatibility constraint (i.e. the truthtelling constraint) is
given by
π0(θ) = βψ0(
2X
i=1
qi(θ)− βθ), (8)
where π0(θ) = ∂π(bθ\θ)∂θ for bθ = θ. Integration by parts gives the following
expression for expected profitsZ θ¯
θ
π(θ)dF (θ) = β
Z θ¯
θ
ψ0(
2X
i=1
qi(θ)− βθ)(1− F (θ))dθ (9)
where π(θ) = 0 due to costly rents.
Maximizing expected W w.r.t
n
Ri(θˆ), qi(θˆ)
o
subject to (9) defines the
regulatory policy under coordination:"Z r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi) + (1 + b)
Z rbi
0
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi)
#
= ψ0(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ) + βψ00(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , i = 1, 2 (10)
(1 + b)G(rbi\qi(θ)) + [1−G(rbi\qi(θ))]− re = 0, i = 1, 2 (11)
Increasing the quality of the loan portfolio, the expected cash-flow increases,
and the probability of paying the bankruptcy cost b decreases. The opti-
mal policy balances this eﬀect against the auditing costs associated with
increased quality (the first term on the right-hand side of (10)) and the in-
formation rent captured by the bank (the second term on the right-hand
side of (10)). When quality increases the bank’s gain from misrepresenting
the innate quality θ increases, and this will materialize as increased bank
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profit due to the truth-telling constraint. Therefore, private information in-
troduces a distortion in the choice of quality of the loan portfolio in order
to improve the regulator’s extraction of rents. The distortion entails a re-
duction in loan quality (less monitoring eﬀort) for all types of banks except
the one with the most promising business environment (θ).
Condition (11) determines the optimal level of reserve requirements (or
outside equity). The cost of outside equity should be balanced against
the benefit from reduced bankruptcy costs. As already pointed out by Gi-
ammarino et al. (1993), this rule implies that the probability of a banking
failure is independent of induced quality of the loan portfolio. A low quality
bank, therefore, is induced to hold more equity and to keep more reserves
as a buﬀer against losses. Moreover, private information in banking (in-
ducing lower quality of the loan portfolio), is compensated for by increased
reserve requirements. The capital to loan ratio, therefore, should increase
as a response to private information.
We may further note that there is a regulatory induced contagion of
macroeconomic shocks between the two countries. If one of the two countries
experiences an economic downturn (βi = β), the regulatory induced quality
of the loan portfolios in both countries are aﬀected with equal strength.2
There are two eﬀects at work here. First, the marginal cost associated with
a certain level of quality increases (as seen from the first term on the right-
hand side of (10)). This works to reduce induced quality in both countries.
Second, as seen from the second term on the right-hand side of (10), a low
βi makes rent extraction less important. This works to increase quality.
The second eﬀect, however, disappears as the intrinsic quality of the bank
loans approaches θ.3 Banks of suﬃciently high intrinsic quality, therefore,
will experience a deterioration of induced quality of the loan portfolio in both
markets if one of the markets experiences an economic downturn. Banks of
suﬃciently low intrinsic quality may actually experience an improvement of
loan quality in both markets if there is an economic downturn in one of the
markets (see the parametric specification in section 6).
Moreover, if one of the two countries experiences an economic downturn
and the subsidiary in the other country is induced to reduce the quality of
the loan portfolio, the MNB will face higher capital requirements in both
markets (in order to keep the probability of a banking failure constant).
We can summarize the findings so far in the following result:
Proposition 1 (i) Compared with the first best (symmetric information)
solution, too little eﬀort is devoted to loan quality improvement when there is
2The result that loan qualities are aﬀected exactly equally in both countries is in part
a consequence of the modelling assumption that the quality variables enter additively in
the cost function. Other formulations with qualities being substitutes for the MNB would
yield similar, but not equal contagion eﬀects.
3This is due to the ”no distortion at the top”- property. The second term disappears
when θ = θ since F (θ) = 1.
8
international coordination of banking regulation; qC(θ) < qFB(θ) for θ < θ¯.
(ii) Reserve requirements increase as a response to private information. For
the parametric specification given in section 6 it is further true that: (iii)
an economic downturn in one country causes a detoriation of loan quality in
both countries for banks with suﬃciently high intrinsic quality (θ ≥ Eθ), and
an improvement of loan quality in both countries for banks with suﬃciently
low intrinsic quality (θ < Eθ).(iv) An economic downturn in one country
causes an increase in the capital ratio in both countries for banks with suf-
ficiently high intrinsic quality (θ ≥ Eθ), and a reduction in the capital ratio
in both countries for banks with suﬃciently low intrinsic quality (θ < Eθ).
4 Non-cooperative regulation of the MNB
We now turn to a situation in which the two regulators do not coordinate
their regulatory policies towards the banking sector. Instead, the regula-
tory authorities in the two countries choose reserve requirements, insurance
premia (i.e set capital requirements) and set targets with respect to the
qualities of the loan portfolios independently. The MNB relates to each
regulator separately. They cannot credibly share information and they act
non-cooperatively.4
We characterize the regulatory policy of country 1 (Country 2 has a
analogous problem). The regulator seeks to maximize the expected domestic
surplus, subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
The regulator of country 1 now has to take into account that its choice of
regulatory rules (reserve requirements and insurance premium) has strategic
implications for the behavior of country 2.
To take care of the strategic interaction between regulators, the regula-
tory policy of country 2 is characterized by a policy rule R2(q2) and P2(q2),
specifying the reserve requirements and the premium to be paid in country
2 as a function of the realized loan quality level in that country. (Under rel-
atively mild conditions—essentially unrestricted communication between the
agent and each principal—there is no loss of generality in assuming that each
country oﬀers such a policy, see Martimort and Stole (2002).) Given the
policy of country 2, country 1 chooses its best policy towards the domestic
subsidiary. With a slight abuse of notation, let π˜(R1, P1, q1, θ) denote the
MNB’s indirect profit function vis-a-vis country 1; i.e.
π˜1(R1, P1, q1, θ) = max
q2
π(R1, P1, q1, R2(q2), P2(q2), q2, θ) (12)
4There is an established literature on the regulation of multinational enterprises that
focuses on tax policy issues. See e.g. Bond and Gresik (1996), Calzolari (2001), Olsen and
Osmundsen (2001,2002).
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where π(R1, P1, q1, R2, P2, q2, θ) is the MNB’s direct profit defined by (3).
Let q˜2(q1, θ) be the MNB’s optimal choice in (12); it is given by the first-
order condition
0 = R0(q˜2)[1−G(1−R2(q˜2)\q˜2)] +
Z r
1−R2(q˜2)
[r2 +R2(q˜2)− 1]dG(r2\q˜2)
−re[(R02(q˜2) + P 02(q˜2)]− ψ0(q1 + q˜2 − βθ) (13)
It is important to note that policy measures taken by the regulator in country
1 to influence the domestic quality level q1, will induce a response by the
firm so that the foreign quality level q2 = q˜2 will be aﬀected as well. For a
given regulatory policy from the foreign country, the marginal eﬀect ∂q˜2∂q1 can
in principle be found from (13).
Given the policy of country 2, the optimal policy of country 1 can be
found by applying the Revelation Principle in the usual way, taking into
account that the relevant profit function for the MNB is now the indirect
profit function π˜1() defined by (12).
Incentive compatibility requires that the firm’s rent π1(θ) now satisfies
π01(θ) = ∂π˜1∂θ . Since we have
∂π˜1
∂θ =
∂π
∂θ by the envelope property, we see that
equations corresponding to (8) and (9) must hold for the rent π1(θ), with
now q2 = q˜2(q1, θ) substituted on the RHS of the equations. Specifically,
a bank with innate quality θ + dθ can always mimic a bank with lower
innate quality θ and by that save ’eﬀort’ costs amounting to βψ0dθ, so the
regulatory scheme in country 1 must allow for this rent diﬀerential; i.e. we
must have
π01(θ) = βψ0(q1(θ) + q˜2(q1(θ), θ)− βθ) (14)
Maximization of the expected value of the national objectiveW1 given in (4),
subject to IC constraints represented by the equivalent of (9), and taking
account of (13), then leads to the following first-order conditions"Z r
rb1
[r1 +R1 − 1] dGq1(r1\q1) + (1 + b)
Z rb1
0
[r1 +R1 − 1] dGq1(r1\q1)
#
= ψ0(q1 + q˜2 − βθ) + βψ00(q1 + q˜2 − βθ)(1 +
∂q˜2
∂q1
)
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , (15)
(1 + b)G(rb1\q1(θ)) + [1−G(rb1\q1(θ))]− re = 0. (16)
The left-hand side of the first equation captures the marginal national gains
of increased domestic loan quality, just as in the cooperative case represented
by (10). The right-hand side of the equation captures the marginal costs,
consisting of marginal resource costs devoted to screening and auditing (the
first term) and increased rents (the second term). Compared to the coop-
erative case, the only diﬀerence is that the term accounting for increased
rents now contains an additional factor, namely the bank’s foreign quality
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response ∂q˜2∂q1 . Intuitively, when the national regulator induces the bank to
increase the domestic quality level by one unit, the bank adjusts the foreign
quality such that the extra resources required to achieve the new domestic
level is 1 + ∂q˜2∂q1 . From (14) we then see that the increase in rents will be
βψ00 · (1 + ∂q˜2∂q1 ), and this explains the last term in (15).
The quality levels are substitutes for the bank, and the foreign quality
response will then be negative; ∂q˜2∂q1 < 0, see below. By inducing the MNB to
increase domestic loan quality, the local regulator provokes a ”soft” response
by the foreign regulator; the MNBs subsidiary in country 2 is induced to
lower its loan quality. This implies that the national regulator perceives
the costs associated with increased rents to be smaller than does the supra-
national regulator, and hence that he has less of an incentive to distort
quality downwards to extract rents. Other things equal, the national regu-
lator will therefore implement a higher domestic quality level for the bank’s
loans.5
Equation (16) is the national regulator’s optimality condition for the do-
mestic subsidiary’s reserve requirements (R1). Variations in these require-
ments do not generate repercursions for the bank’s foreign operations, and
conditional on the domestic level of loan quality, reserve requirements will
therefore be eﬃcient. However, since domestic loan quality will deviate from
the level that is optimal under cooperative regulation, reserve requirements
will also deviate from the cooperative levels.
In equilibrium we must have q˜2(q1(θ), θ) = q2(θ), and from (13) we then
see that the quality response in equilibrium is given by
∂q˜2
∂q1
(q1(θ), θ) =
q02(θ)
q01(θ)− β
where primes denote derivatives. (Writing (13) as H(q1, q˜2, θ) = 0 we have
H1+H2
∂q˜2
∂q1 = 0 andH1q
0
1+H2q
0
2+Hθ = 0, where subscripts onH denote par-
tials. Elimination of H2 yields the stated formula.) Similar considerations
apply for the regulator in country 2, and it then follows that in equilibrium
the following conditions holdZ r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi) + (1 + b)
Z rbi
0
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi)
= ψ0(Σqi − βθ) + βψ00(Σqi − βθ)
·
1 +
q0j(θ)
q0i(θ)− β
¸
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , (17)
5This result follows from our assumption about the cost of improving loan quality.
An increase in eﬀort in subsidiary 1 increases the marginal cost of eﬀort in subsidiary
2. Hence, there is an underlying assumption about scarce managerial resources in the
MNB. If we instead allowed for ”learning-by-doing” eﬀects, the marginal costs of eﬀort in
subsidiary 2 would have decreased (if eﬀort in subsidiary 1 increases). In this case, the
foreign quality response will be positive, ∂q˜2∂q1 > 0 (complements), and the common-agency
eﬀect would cause a detoriation of loan quality.
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(1 + b)G(rbi\qi(θ)) + [1−G(rbi\qi(θ))]− re = 0, (18)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Following a procedure similar to Martimort
(1992,1996), one can see that if this system of diﬀerential equations defines
a pair of nondecreasing loan quality schedules q1(θ) and q2(θ), and those
schedules in addition satisfy a set of implementability conditions, they con-
stitute a pure-strategy diﬀerential Nash-equilibrium outcome for the com-
mon agency game. The implementability conditions imply that the response
eﬀects ∂q˜j∂qi are negative, which in turn implies, as we have seen, that quality
levels are higher than under cooperative regulation.
As commented above, the optimal level of reserve requirements as a
function of domestic loan quality is unchanged, and is given by (18). This
gives the following result:
Proposition 2 Compared with international coordination, strategic regula-
tion of a MNB entails (i) higher loan quality and (ii) reduced capital ratios
in both countries. The combined eﬀect of these strategic adjustments makes
the probability of a banking failure remain the same.
The reason why regulatory policy induces the MNB to reduce loan qual-
ity in the first place, is the rent extraction eﬀect. The regulatory authority,
which is concerned about the social cost of its deposit insurance scheme,
dislikes leaving extra-normal rents to the MNB since this could instead have
been added to the deposit insurance premium. Hence, a more demand-
ing regulatory regime, in the sense of increased incentives for improving
loan quality, is desirable from the MNB’s point of view. In other words, the
MNB benefits from the lack of an internationally coordinated policy towards
regulation and supervision of banks.
5 Strategic regulation with ownership eﬀects
So far we have assumed that the regulatory policy towards the MNB is
derived from the regulator’s concern about the cost of the deposit insurance
fund. As noted above, an alternative would be to allow the regulator to care
also about the banking profit falling to domestic owners. In that case the
objective function of the regulator is given byWi = (1+λ)Si+δiπ, where δi
is the ownership share of country i shareholders, λ is the general equilibrium
shadow cost of public funds (assumed equal in the two countries), and Si is
the social cost of the deposit insurance fund (previously denoted Wi).
Following the above procedure, the modified regulatory policy under
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coordination will now be given by"Z r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi) + (1 + b)
Z rbi
0
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi)
#
= ψ0(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ) +
1 + λ− δ1 − δ2
1 + λ βψ
00(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
We see that the previous analysis captures the case in which the entire MNB
is owned by a third country (δ1 = δ2 = 0). As we should expect, a regulator
caring for banking profit (in addition to the social cost of running the deposit
insurance fund), will be less eager to extract rents, and, hence, loan quality
will be higher (everything else equal).
Assuming, instead, strategic regulation by each country, the non-cooperative
equilibrium is now characterized byZ r
rbi
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi) + (1 + b)
Z rbi
0
[ri +Ri − 1] dGqi(ri\qi)(19)
= ψ0 + 1 + λ− δi
1 + λ βψ
00
·
1 +
q0j(θ)
q0i(θ)− β
¸
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , i = 1, 2
This reveals the ownership eﬀect of strategic banking regulation. As be-
fore, we identify the strategic eﬀect due to the soft response of the other
country (dq2dq1 < 0), which explains the increase in loan quality from lack
of coordination. However, when bank profits enter the objective function,
the importance of rent extraction (induced by lowering loan quality) diﬀers
between a domestic regulator and an international regulatory body. A do-
mestic regulator will be more tempted to extract rent since a smaller share
of the banking profit enters domestic welfare. This is seen in the above
expressions by noticing that 1 + λ − δi > 1 + λ − δ1 − δ2. Hence, the
domestic regulator puts more weight on the rent extraction eﬀect than an
international regulatory body. This works against the strategic eﬀect, and
we cannot generally determine whether loan quality is higher or lower under
strategic banking regulation than under international coordination.6
From the equilibrium conditions it is clear that the pattern of ownership
will have implications for regulatory policy. Following Olsen and Osmund-
sen (2001), we can derive some comparative results regarding coordinated
versus strategic regulation. As already noted, if δ1 = δ2 = 0, ownership
eﬀects are absent, and strategic regulation leads to higher loan quality in
both countries. Assuming that the solutions vary continuously with the pa-
rameters (which is shown to hold in our parametric specification), this will
also be the case for suﬃciently small values of δ1 and δ2. Assuming instead
6A similar eﬀect is present in Martimort (1996b), who studies the implications of a
pro-firm bias on the part of regulators in a setting with contract complements.
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that δ1 + δ2 = 1, and that λ = 0, there is no rent extraction under coordi-
nation (since profit is equally valuable as surplus in the deposit insurance
fund). Under strategic regulation, however, the loan quality is distorted
downwards in order to extract rent. The reason is that 1 $ increase in the
deposit insurance premium, reduces domestic profit by δi $ (<1). Hence,
lack of international coordination banking regulation will causes a down-
ward distortion in loan quality. Again, by assuming continuity, that same
will hold for λ suﬃciently small and δ1+ δ2 suﬃciently close to 1. This can
be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose two countries are symmetric. (i) If both λ and the
outside (third country) ownership share 1−δ1−δ2 are suﬃciently small, then
strategic banking regulation leads to lower loan quality (and higher capital
ratios) in both countries compared to a situation with international coordi-
nation. (ii) If the outside ownership share is suﬃciently large, then strategic
banking regulation leads to higher loan quality (and lower capital ratios) in
both countries compared to a situation with international coordination.
The eﬀect of ownership structure on banking regulation may have conse-
quences for what kind of ownership a MNB may end up with. As seen from
(19), if the shareholders in both countries symmetrically sell their shares
to third-country shareholders, then the MNB will be induced to lower its
loan quality (since rent extraction becomes more important for the national
regulators), and banking profit (π(θ)) will tend to fall. A MNB, therefore,
will benefit from being owned by shareholders from the markets in which the
MNB operates. If a third-country shareholder sets up a new foreign bank
with subsidiaries in each of these foreign markets, the charter-value of the
bank will actually increase if it is sold to shareholders from these countries.
6 A parametric specification
In this section we derive explicit solutions of regulatory policies by assuming
specific functional forms. We suppose here that G(r\qi) = G( rQ(qi)) where
G(t) is a CDF on some interval [0, t¯] and Q(qi) is increasing. Then a higher
quality level qi will shift the distribution of returns ri to a more favorable
one in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
6.1 Coordinated regulation
In the appendix we show that the optimality condition for qi can now be
written as
K(re, b)Q0(qi) = ψ0(q1+ q2i−βθ) +βψ00(q1+ q2−βθ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , i = 1, 2
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where K(re, b) is increasing in re and decreasing in b.
Further, we assume that ψ() is quadratic; ψ(e) = c2e2, and that θ is
uniform on [0, 1] Suppose moreover that Q0(qi) = Q1qi + Q2, Qi ≥ 0.
The Qk− parameters can be seen as measures of the marginal productivity
of quality with respect to improving loan quality. Then optimal qi under
coordinated regulation is given by
K(re, b)(Q1qi +Q2) = c(q1 + q2 − βθ) + βc(1− θ), i = 1, 2
For symmetric countries (where q1 = q2) there is a well defined solution
(denoted by qC) provided K(re, b)Q1 < 2c, and then
qC(θ) =
KQ2 + cβ(2θ − 1)
2c−KQ1
, K = K(re, b), KQ1 < 2c
Comparing with the first-best solution (with symmetric information about
θ)
qFB(θ) =
KQ2 + cβθ
2c−KQ1
we see that the quality levels are distorted downwards under asymmetric in-
formation; qC(θ) < qFB(θ). The relative distortion qFB(θ)−qC(θ)qFB(θ) =
cβ(1−θ)
KQ2+cβθ
increases with cβ and decreases with KQ2.
6.2 Non-cooperative regulation
The equilibrium condition for q1 is in this case (this follows from (19)):
K(re, b)(Q1qi +Q2) = c(q1 + q2 − βθ) + βc
·
1 +
q02(θ)
q01(θ)− β
¸
(1− θ). (20)
Similarly for q2. We seek linear (and symmetric) solutions for the quality
profiles
q1(θ) = q2(θ) = qnc(θ) = q¯ − (1− θ)q0 (21)
As shown in the appendix this yields
q¯ =
KQ2 + cβ
2c−KQ1
= qFB(θ¯)
while the solution for q0 that satisfies the implementability condition 2q0 ≤ β
is
q0 =
β
2 (2c+K1)
µ
K1 + 5c−
q¡
K21 + 2K1c+ 9c
2
¢¶
, K1 = K(re, b)Q1
The slope q0 of the equilibrium quality profile qnc(θ) is increasing in β and
decreasing in K1. Comparing with the cooperative solution qC(θ), we find
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that the latter profile is steeper (q0 < q0C), and, hence, that there is more
provision of quality in the non-cooperative case (qnc(θ) > qC(θ)). This is
due to the presence of a strategic eﬀect in the latter case.
We observe that, for Q1 = 0 we have q0 = β2 and hence qnc(θ) = qFB(θ).
In this (extreme) case the strategic eﬀect (the foreign quality adjustment) is
so strong that none of the national regulators finds it worth while to distort
domestic quality from the first-best level. Any domestic distortion would
be completely oﬀset by the bank switching more of its quality enhancing
resources to the subsidiary in the other country. In this case the quality
variables are perfect substitutes for the bank, and it isn’t possible for any
of the non-coordinated regulators to use unilateral quality distortions to
extract rents from the MNB. In equilibrium there will thus be no distortions,
and the first-best outcome is realized. With coordinated eﬀorts the two
regulators will however be able to extract rents this way, and in fact the
optimal relative distortion qFB(θ)−qC(θ)qFB(θ) was seen to be independent of the
parameter Q1.
For positive values of Q1, i.e. when the marginal productivity of quality
is increasing with more quality in each country, the quality variables are no
longer perfect substitutes for the bank, and then it becomes possible for each
regulator to extract rents by unilateral distortions of domestic quality. The
non-cooperative equilibrium will then involve distortions from the first-best
in each country, but the distortions will be smaller than in the cooperative
case.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed how entry of multi-national bank (MNB) sub-
sidiaries aﬀects banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands
internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB operates under the legislation of
several countries - both the home country and the host countries. Although
these countries have agreed upon minimum standards and supervisory prin-
ciples, such as in the EU directives or the Basle Accords, substantial degrees
of freedom are still left to national regulators. For instance, figures pre-
sented in BIS (1999) shows that there is no clear evidence that the variation
in capital ratios between G-10 banks has been reduced since the 1988 Basel
Accord.
Host country regulation of MNBs subsidiaries is shown to create cross-
border externalities, where the supervisors and regulators in one country
will be concerened with the standards in the home country and in other
host countries. Our main results are as follows.
First, there is a regulatory induced contagion of macroeconomic shocks
between the two countries. If one of the two countries experiences an eco-
nomic downturn, the regulatory induced quality of the loan portfolios in
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both countries are aﬀected with equal strength. Banks of suﬃciently high
(low) intrinsic quality will experience a deterioration (improvment) of in-
duced quality of the loan portfolio in both markets if one of the markets
experiences an economic downturn.
Second, lack of international coordination of banking regulation works
to lower capital adequacy requirements. However, in equilibrium regula-
tors respond by increasing the incentives to improve asset quality, making
the probability of banking failure insensitive to the decentralized nature of
banking regulation.
Thrid, ownership of the MNB is shown to be of importance for the out-
come of strategic banking regulation. If the MNB is owned by shareholders
from outside the market operated by the bank (”third-country sharhold-
ers”), the regulatory regime becomes more distortive since regulators become
more eager to extract banking profits. Consequently, with more ”inside-
shareholders”, the regulatory policy becomes more pro-bank industry in-
clined.
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Appendix
Here we derive the claims made in section 6.
Note first that (since rbi = 1 − Ri) conditions (10),(11) can be written
(using integration by parts)
∂
∂qi
Eri + b
∂
∂qi
Ã
−
Z rbi
0
G(ri\qi)dri
!
(22)
= ψ0(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ) + βψ00(
2X
i=1
qi − βθ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ) , i = 1, 2
bG(rbi\qi(θ)) + 1− re = 0, i = 1, 2 (23)
Given that G(r\qi) = G( rQ(qi)) where G(t) is a CDF on some interval [0, t¯]
and Q(qi) is increasing, then r = tQ and so E(r\qi) = Q(qi)γ, where γ = Et
a constant (independent of q). Moreover we have
− ∂∂qi
Z rbi
0
G(
r
Q(qi)
)dr =
Z rbi
0
G0(
r
Q
)
r
Q2
drQ0(qi)
= Q0(qi)
Z rbi /Q
0
tG0(t)dt = Q0(qi)k(re, b)
where k(re, b) is a constant independent of qi; this follows from (23), which
for the present specification says that bG(r
b
i
Q ) = r
e−1. We see that k(re, b) is
an increasing function of r
e−1
b . Letting K(r
e, b) = γ+k(re, b) the optimality
condition for qi in the cooperative case can then be written as stated in the
text, and K(re, b) is also an increasing function of r
e−1
b .
For the non-cooperative case, substituting (21) into (20) yields
KQ1
¡
q¯ − (1− θ)q0
¢
+KQ2 = 2c
¡
q¯ − (1− θ)q0
¢
−cβθ+βc
·
1 +
q0
q0 − β
¸
(1−θ).
Collecting terms we get two equations for q¯ and q0:
KQ1q¯ +KQ2 = 2cq¯ − cβ
KQ1q
0 = −2cq0 + cβ + βc
·
1 +
q0
q0 − β
¸
This yields the solutions stated in the text.
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